Many of the debates among competing paradigms in political science are concerned with peripheral elements rather than the basic assumptions of the paradigms. Since the major assumptions of any paradigm are rooted in metaphysical theories of the nature of reality, tests of one paradigm are likely to deal with phenomena that may not be considered in another. The article outlines the main metaphysical theories -materialism, idealism, and dualism -then proceeds to demonstrate that the primacy of matter versus ideas is central to paradigms of explanation in one area of political science, namely, theories of urban unrest. A survey of competing theories highlights the metaphysical assumptions and methodological preferences of each contending paradigm. The article argues that more attention should be paid to the metaphysical assumptions of paradigms in order to sharpen the focus of the research agenda.
INTRODUCTION
When Rudolf Carnap suggested that social scientists should avoid metaphysical problems and seek to define key concepts in terms of observable characteristics, he was writing at a time when he saw behavioristic experimental psychology as preferable to endless efforts at theoretical speculation that would fail to advance human knowledge because the conceptual discourse contained metaphysical words "devoid of meaning." 1 Although his advice may well have served to steer social scientists into a more data-oriented approach toward their craft, the implications of his disdain for metaphysical analysis have yet to be critiqued in specific terms. Empirical social scientists followed his advice in regard to eschewing metaphysical discussion, but they were unable to avoid making metaphysical assumptions in their theories, as we shall see below.
There are many alternative reconstructions of the logic of science, and there is a healthy dissensus of how social science can best advance. 2 But one common trend is the desire among quantitatively oriented social scientists to build theories and to collect data with a view to discarding various theories or finding some of them consistent with data. Often a particular phenomenon is the center of attention -urban unrest, for example. Data are assembled to determine whether the central phenomenon varies over time and space. Other data are collected in an effort to account for variations in the central phenomenon, and a set of indepen-THEORIES OF URBAN UNREST 521 dent variables is said to predict to the key dependent variable. However imperfectly, the data-level findings are somehow equivalenced hermeneutically to a theory-level language, and a theory is proclaimed to have been tested. As this rough scenario is repeated many times, the social sciences develop several alternative theories. Advocates of the theories vie for acceptance of their approach, thereby producing confusion about the state of knowledge in a particular field of study. Political science is no exception to this regard.
Conceptual and theoretical babel, thus, are a major problem in the social sciences today. Thomas Kuhn, a philosopher of science who views midcentury social science's plethora of disparate theories as something to be explained in macrohistorical terms, 3 has provided more subtle advice than the earlier suggestions of the logical positivists. While some philosophers prefer to use logic to dissolve the mind-body question, 4 a most questionable undertaking indeed, 5 Kuhn prefers to meet the issue directly. The Carnapian reconstruction of the logic of scientific inquiry, similarly, has been upstaged by a more critical Kuhnian view of science as a social and political process in which the pursuit of truth is seen as rather elusive. Although Kuhn has many critics, 6 his main contribution has been to urge us to consider that the progress of science consists in looking at "paradigms" 7 and the social structure within science that permits some theories to survive while others fall into disuse.
This essay is an effort to move one step beyond Kuhn, though clearly in the Kuhnian tradition. The aim is to explicate the nature of paradigmatic debates in political science in terms of assumptions as yet unspecified by any of the key theorists. These basic assumptions comprise the metaphysical substructure of the theories. As stated by William Bluhm more than a decade ago, social science theory contains implicit metaphysical assumptions. 8 Following Bluhm's suggestion, I have elsewhere demonstrated the metaphysical underpinnings of theories of international integration. 9 My purpose here is to unpack paradigms advanced by empirical scholars studying urban unrest into specific metaphysical components so that the general thesis can become more clearly established within political science.
What are the advantages of reopening the question of metaphysics that Carnap was so eager to avoid and Kuhn insists have been at the root of paradigmatic controversies in the sciences what is real or unreal. 11 The key ontological question, classically posed, is whether the mind controls the body, the body controls the mind, or whether there is some complex formula that explains why sometimes one controls the other or appears to do so. All theories in the natural and social sciences make metaphysical assumptions; were they to fail to do so, their formulations would be empty in content, for they would not refer to reality at all. For the natural sciences, the terrain of inquiry has focused mostly on material substances, so metaphysical problems have presented few paradoxes. For the social sciences, attitudes and ideologies are important; material factors, such as communication flows and income levels, are often considered as causes of the ideas espoused by individuals, but sometimes ideas are regarded as the causes of material factors.
There are several alternative ontological views in metaphysics. 12 If all of reality is basically matter (that is, material substances of one kind or another), then the body is dominant over the mind and attitudes are reducible to material substances; this position is known as metaphysical materialism. If ideas and perceptions are the irreducible components of reality, then mind dominates body and material substances have no independent role to play in a causal system. This second position is known as metaphysical idealism. Idealists believe that the world exists some how independently of our conceptions of the world, or so they claim. But we may feel that it would appear common sense to combine both positions into one. Metaphysical realism is the view that we can reduce everything in the world to two basic elements -matter and ideas -but that the two elements are separate and distinct ( Table 1) .
As such philosophers like Mario Bunge and Richard Taylor point out, the commonsensical plausibility of realism turns out to be more baffling than either idealism or materialism. 13 Interactionism is the realist view that mind and body interact on each other, but this view begs the question as to how, in what manner and under which sets of circumstances the interaction moves from body to mind or mind to body. Parallelism is a realist theory in which body and mind do not have any impact upon each other yet run on parallel tracks throughout time and thus the naive observer may falsely infer that one track is causally linked to the other. Lest the reader feel compelled to retreat to the simplicity of materialism and idealism, there are alternative conceptions of both positions within philosophy as well. For idealists the basic phenomena are ideas and perceptions of reality; for materialists, matter is the irreducible phenomenon. Idealists reduce matter to ideas (perceptions of matter). Materialists seek to reduce ideas to such material forms as movements of electrical impulses in the brain. In both theories there are two further possibilities-either the nonbasic element has no existential property and thus is some sort of illusion (nonphenomenon) or the nonbasic element is an epiphenomenon that appears superficially to have a separate existence but in fact is correlated perfectly with the basic phenomenon. Epiphenomenalist materialism is the view that the body acts on the mind to produce perceptual consciousness, but not vice versa. In social science terms, an individual's income and material circumstances produce an awareness of class membership, according to epiphenomenalist materialism. Physicalism is the view that the mind is physical in the first place, thus it is illogical to say that "body acts on mind," since only body can act on body. But physicalism would deny an independent role to logic and thus to science. For idealists there is a similar epiphenomenalist idealism wherein the mind tells the body what is going on, and a corresponding mentalism that points out the logical contradictions in such a statement if the universe consists solely of ideas and perceptions. Often, mentalism is attacked on the ground that it is a kind of solipsism in which everyone has a private conception of reality, a sort of schizophrenia in which there can be no final arbiter on what is or is not real. For the epiphenomenal idealist, exposure to the attitudes and opinions of one's culture provides the verbal labels for describing physical reality and the norms that govern an individual's behavior.
Realism is a dualistic theory, that is, everything in the world is reduced to two basic components. The monistic theories discussed above, materialism and idealism, reduce all of reality to one basic form. According to double aspect theory, we may combine dualism and monism in the view that there is basically one substance in the world but that mind and body are two metaphysically equivalent though analytically distinct aspects of the same thing.
The reader who has come this far may have a sense of bewilderment at metaphysics. How can we ever decide questions about the relationship between mind and body, attitudes and behavior, or similar rephrasings of the basic metaphysical dichotomies about the basic substance(s) of the real world? What evidence can help us to resolve the dilemma? David Hume's metaphysical scepticism is the position that insufficient evidence exists to decide the question; the structure of metaphysical arguments is such that we either must observe metaphysical glue binding mind and body or else our speculation is "sophistry and illusion," as he insisted in a kind of brute empiricism that would deny the existence of anything not established by "experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence." 14 But the natural sciences have had to take unobserved phenomena into account during the twentieth century; intricate theories and explicit assumptions have been developed in order to go beyond Humeanism. Positivists go one step beyond Hume by denying that metaphysical speculation is worth the effort; since there is no ultimate way for scientists to resolve the issue, the quest for the correct metaphysical theory should be abandoned, or so they argue while often urging a materialist metaphysics in practice, as indicated by the first sentence of this article.
THE REVIEW OF POLITICS i
A moment's reflection demonstrates that political scientists make metaphysical assumptions all the time in their research. If we do a survey of attitudes, we are assigning primacy to ideas and verbalized reports of nonattitudinal phenomena. If we analyze data on percapita income, kilowatt-hour electricity production, unemployment rates, and rates of economic growth for countries around the world, we are operating within a paradigm that gives importance to material phenomena. Studies that combine both attitudes and physical attributes are cast in a realist paradigm, as when questions in a survey deal with attitudes as well as income, and when aggregate cross-national studies use national income along with multicountry survey data. Poorly designed attitude studies and aggregate data analyses can be lopsided metaphysically; they are quite often monistic in design. Studies conceived in dualistic terms are able to answer more sophisticated metaphysical questions than those using a monistic design.
In short, political scientists have evidence relevant to metaphysical debates. It is therefore appropriate to take stock of our findings in the light of metaphysical alternatives. Such is the aim of the discussion below. We proceed by exploring one of the ongoing debates in the field of political science, theories of urban unrest, followed by an overall assessment. Our metaphysical distinction between idealism, materialism, and realism will be understood to cover the relative impact of ideational and material factors as explanations for variance in urban unrest. We will defer consideration of the more general relationship between matter and ideas to the concluding section of the essay. As some of the theorists may be surprised that they have been classified in a particular manner, I should note here that the pigeonholes are for the theories alone; a particular individual may espouse two different metaphysical views in two distinct paradigms. The basis for classification is twofold. The text of the verbal theories provides one clue to the metaphysical assumptions of a theory -through definitions of key concepts. Since I am attempting to illustrate metaphysical dissensus with reference to empirically tested theories, a second clue consists of the nature of variables used in tests of a paradigm. Seldom do we find any discrepancy between the two sources of classification, but more clarity is often obtained by examining the variables than the verbal statements of a theory, as we might expect in a social science so heavily influenced by Carnapian logical positivism. If a theorist defines concepts entirely as mental phenomena (such as consciousness, ideas, opinions, perceptions, role orientations), we will be able to give an idealist label to the theory. If the concepts are all stated as material factors (such as levels of income, percapita electricity production, trade flows), our classification will specify the label materialism. We will then look at whether the theorist connects mental with physical factors -and how. URBAN 
UNREST
The Metaphysical Alternatives:
Politics is generally assumed to be an arena in which conflicts are resolved peacefully. When violence erupts, as Karl von Clausewitz suggests, politics is continued, though by different means. 
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At several periods of American history riots have been linked to ethnic factors. One such period occurred during the middle and late 1960's, and it affected nearly every urban community in the United States. Various theories arose as to the origins of the violence, and metaphysical assumptions guided research on the subject (Table 2) , although some theories ignored the axiom of von Clausewitz, as we shall see below.
Most definitions of "urban unrest" focus on materialist phenomena, notably acts of violence. To establish a theory as idealist or materialist, we need to look at the postulated causes of unrest. From a materialist perspective, the causes of physical violence are rooted in the objective conditions of poverty and inequality of those who riot. But some theorists, we find, believe that "urban unrest" has its origins in mental phenomena -attitudes of alienation, protest, frustration, and on role orientations. Metaphysical realists say that material conditions and attitudinal orientations are both important in explaining the outbreak of urban violence; the exact connection between various causes and effects involves several permutations of ideal and material factors. To review various theories, it will be useful, first of all, to examine the various "reports" that attracted so much public attention.
Reports on Urban Unrest in the 1960's:
As we may recall, the Harlem riot of 1964 was not thought to be a part of a larger pattern until midsummer 1965, when the Watts section of Los Angeles was aflame for six successive days. In the fall of 1965 the first of several reports on urban unrest emerged. Entitled The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, the report was issued by the U.S. Department of Labor from a committee chaired by Daniel Moynihan; the document was known popularly as the Moynihan Report. According to Moynihan, the causes of problems for blacks are rooted in a fragile family structure in which fathers are increasingly absent (although his data actually shows that seventy-four percent of black families have fathers). 17 Black society was suffering "deterioration," said Moynihan, so unless the "damage is repaired, efforts to end discrimination and poverty and injustice will come to little." 18 Moynihan, who wanted a jobs program for blacks, argued that even full employment would not provide the same economic stability that was clearly the basis of family stability for this group. There are other groups with different traditions . . . who can take a lot of punishment without much impact on the family structure. But urban Negroes cannot. 19 Thus, Moynihan argues that there is a black culture different from the culture of other groups, and even economic inputs into black society would not change the fundamental attitudes of black persons. Moynihan's metaphysics assigns primacy to "cultural" attitudes, relegating material factors to the role of epiphenomena that would improve only if attitudes could change. This is epiphenomenalist idealism.
The second report, commissioned by California Governor Edmund Brown, Sr., to explain the Watts riot of 1965, was chaired by John McCone. The McCone Commission concluded that the riot was kept alive by "several gangs, with membership of young men ranging in ages from fourteen to thirty-five years." 20 The rioters were typified, in short, as riffraff with inappropriate thoughts; material factors of the rioters were considered to be secondary considerations. Thus, the McCone theory, clearly derived from Gustave Le Bon's The Crowd, 21 is one of epiphenomenalist idealism as well.
The third report was issued in 1968 by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders; the chair was Illinois Governor Otto Kerner. The Kerner Report presented evidence to refute the findings of the McCone Commission: some of the better educated if underemployed blacks were predominant among the rioters. 22 The Kerner Report concluded that white institutions had created and now maintain the ghettoes which were sites for the rioting of the 1960's, though the key recommendation was not to dismantle the white power structure thus identified but rather to pump more money into the slums. The Kerner Commission recommended that the War on Poverty program should receive increased funding. The metaphysics of the Kerner Report show the black rioter as a victim both of poverty (a material condition) and of prejudice (an attitudinal factor). The linkage between poverty and prejudice is that institutionalized attitudes (barriers to equal opportunity) produce poverty, and poor persons riot when they become conscious of their deprivation. As we shall see below, this was an amalgamation of two theories with metaphysically distinct assumptions, producing an appearance of realism.
A number of observers have found fault with the above reports. In all three reports attention is focused on blacks, who are said to misbehave in various ways. As William Ryan notes in Blaming the Victim, blacks are regarded as prone to violence in the three reports because blacks are seen as "savage," somehow different from other races and thus are somehow excused for otherwise unacceptably violent outbursts. 23 As violence spread to include college campuses and to involve the assassination of such political leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, President Lyndon Johnson established yet another commission in June 1968. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, chaired by Milton Eisenhower, established a series of task forces, which in turn published compilations of various sorts that took a wide spectrum of opinion and knowledge into account. Two of the volumes were especially useful from a social science perspective-The Ulitics of Protest by Jerome Skolnick and Violence in America, the latter a collection of essays edited by task force directors Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr. * As the titles of the two volumes indicate, there was a fundamental disagreement on the basic phenomenon under investigation. For previous reports, as well as Graham and Gurr, the focus of attention was on violence and its causes. To speak of violence was to identify something "savage" (in Ryan's terms) that needed to be explained in nonpolitical terms. Attention to protest, however, meant to identify grievances and repression by those in authority and thus to focus on the ideas in a dialogue that had been partly successful through sit-ins, freedom marches, and other peaceful demonstrations and was taking on a new form. Similar to Ryan, Skolnick felt that the causes of urban violence were attitudinal in part and that the tactics of violence were signals to those in power "that concessions must be made or violence will prevail." 25 In short, Skolnick took seriously the rhetoric of such figures as Stokely Carmichael, Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X and others, 26 along with the Clausewitzian principle. The other reports conspicuously failed to analyze the nature of the political demands from the black community.
The Theories:
Our review of the literature, thus, will focus on a paradigmatic dialectic. We may join Ryan by viewing the social science literature on urban unrest in the context of a debate between advocates of blaming-the-victim paradigms and proponents of the paradigms that fault the system of repression itself.
According to theories that blame the victim, the misfortunate are responsible for their own fate. The earliest blaming-the-victim theory is known as social disorganization theory. As formulated by Gustave Le Bon and developed by Robert Park, 27 social disorganization theory argues that "deviant behavior" (presumably including urban unrest and violence) may be explained as imperfect socialization to the norms of society. The peculiarities and confusions of the immigrant or ghetto resident -notably, the apparent lack of social norms, often known as "cultural deprivation" -are due to incomplete assimilation. The misconduct of the slumdweller is due to "social marginality" or "social isolation." In other words, individuals isolated from the "mainstream" act in a strange manner. Extrapolating to the phenomenon of urban unrest, social disorganization theory says that observable psychomotor behavior, called "deviant behavior," is linked to basic attitudes that are formed on the basis of the socioattitudinal proximity between the individual and the dominant values of society. Park's theory encouraged studies on the demographic correlations of "deviant behavior," which tended to show that social isolation went hand-inhand with social "misbehavior" and cultural "deprivation" of slumdwellers. 28 In short, a socioattitudinal property (social isolation) entails another attitude (incoherent social norms or cultural deprivation), which results in various forms of behavior (known as "deviant"); violence, then, is a form of "deviant behavior" (Figure  la) .
One could hardly imagine a more classic presentation of epiphenomenalist idealism. The independent variables are attitudes, and the dependent variable consists of physical behavior: behavior is explained by prior attitudes. Clearly the McCone and Moynihan reports presuppose social disorganization theory. The fact that only twenty-four percent of black families are described in some detail in Moynihan's report, while seventy-six percent have not "deteriorated" in his terms, is simply an inconvenient fact that receives little attention.
But we know better. Thanks to the pioneering participant observation fieldwork of William Foote White, the ghetto life depicted in Street Corner Society was not "disorganized." 29 The myth of failure to have a coherent set of social norms was exploded by White's account of life in a ghetto. As White reported, a complex system of social norms did exist in the Italian slums of Boston. But the content of the norms happened to differ from those of the dominant value system of the larger Anglo society. Theories of social disorganization are now considered passe. They were often replaced by theories of mass society, as developed originally by Emile Durkheim, and more recently explicated by such scholars as Arthur Kornhauser and Neil Smelser. 30 For Kornhauser, explanations of collective social behavior -violent or nonviolent -must take both attitudinal and physical phenomena into account:
Mass society is objectively the atomized society, and subjectively the alienated population. Therefore, mass society is a system in which there is high availability of a population for mobilization by elites. 31 Mass society thus entails a twofold gap between elites and masses. In totalitarian states dominant institutions and values are seen as carefully controlled by the elite subculture. Other subcultures, with their own institutions and value systems are viewed as threats to elite dominance. Elites reward those who follow the elite way and punish those adhering to other value systems until the latter are "atomized" (lack intermediate institutions) and "alienated" (lack a sense of community identity). In nontotalitarian society the same factors can occur as well; rapid social change tears the fabric of a once close-knit society, as family members move away from hometowns to seek employment, abandoning traditional church affiliations and friendships in the process. If newcomers do not reestablish group ties, even when they are free to do so in pluralistic societies, they are available for mobilization by Hitlers to commit acts of violence. Kornhauser appears to imply that mass behavior can be either the responsibility of elites who hold too much power or masses who fail to take advantage of their freedom in pluralistic societies to form intermediate institutions for asserting political demands in legitimate institutional channels.
For Smelser, "hostile outbursts" occur because of the presence of "strain," such as "conflicts of interest . . . and differences in values." 32 Strain is viewed as a structural property of a system and is roughly equivalent to what Kornhauser identifies as "rapid social change." Agencies of political control, according to Smelser, can preclude violence -but not hostility -when they are as powerful as they are in totalitarian societies, and government closes down channels for expressing grievances. In more permissive societies hostility and violent outbursts result when political institutions do not allow parties in dispute to communicate. Smelser also stresses the role of leaders who foment hostile outbursts, and his formulation notes that violence results when those who act on the basis of a "generalized belief (an ideology encoding their alienation) oversimplify the complexities of politics and seek direct action. Hence, we have yet another blaming-the-victim theory.
Thus, in mass society theory a material condition (social change) affects individuals in two ways -an attitudinal condition (alienation) and a physical condition (atomization) result from the uncoupling of traditional institutions. Either atomization or alienation can serve as an antecedent of an attitude (hostility) or a form of behavior (violent outbursts), with political and social institutions playing an intervening role in the process (Figure lb) . The metaphysical view is parallelism, as the connection between alienation and atomization is unspecified, and either condition can result in unrest or violence.
The Kerner Report subscribes to mass society theory, despite a chapter anachronistically entitled "Unemployment, Family Structure, and Social Disorganization." But the recommendations of the Kerner Report did not deal with the institutions responsible for alienation and atomization. The fact that so many rioters were alienated but not atomized, as they were members of civil rights organizations and held regular jobs, is one of those uncomfortable facts that is swept under the verbal rug provided by mass society theorists, who in turn provide formulations that often lack specificity for systematic tests. The Kerner Report, which recommended that more funds be channeled into the ghettos, was relying on yet another theory -economic deprivation theory.
Ted Gurr, one of the coauthors of a compilation of studies that emerged from the Eisenhower Commission, indeed champions a form of economic deprivation theory. 33 A simple version of this theory would tell us that the impetus to riot is a function of the degree of economic deprivation. But this might not immediately explain why rioting took place in the 1960's rather than in the 1970's, when economic conditions in urban ghettos had grown worse. Accordingly, Gurr advanced a theory of relative deprivation instead, based on observations by Crane Brinton and James Davies that violence results when areas of increasing prosperity are followed by a period of economic decline, a theory found in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville. 34 Brinton claimed evidence for an 536 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS era of economic downturn after an era of rising expectations in the case of the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions. An increasing gap between levels of aspiration and levels of satisfaction is central to the theory of Davies, which Gurr sought to test, though most studies have found little support for Davies's theory. 35 Clearly, the Kerner Report accepted relative deprivation theory in light of recommendations to increase funding to War on Poverty programs.
Gurr's theory may be unpacked as follows (Figure lc) . The dependent variable is a physical property, "magnitude of violence." The casual sequence is "a perception of relative deprivation, the development of discontent, [then] politicization of that discontent, and finally . . . violent action." 36 The intensity of violent action, in turn, is a function of how much attitudinal support and physical force that elites and counterelites bring to bear in their politicization of the conflict. "Relative deprivation" is defined as a perception that there is a "discrepancy between [material] value expectations and . . . value capabilities." 37 As Gurr notes, his theory has "both psychological and societal" elements. 38 Clearly, his theory is interactionist. When material conditions change (values increase or decrease), and attitudes (expectations of material conditions) do not go in the same direction, a personal attitude (perception of relative deprivation) leads the individual to a political attitude (discontent), and then a material condition (violent action) occurs. As individuals expect more but do not receive more, they experience deprivation in a relative sense; as they receive less but do not reduce their material expectations, they also feel relative deprivation. One of Gurr's examples of expectations in the role of antecedents is the period of the 1960's: he notes that black power movements imparted increased value expectations but material conditions for blacks lagged behind these heightened expectations. 39 He predicts that if "blacks do develop a substantial measure of institutional support and resources in the ghettos . . . the likely long-range effect is a reduction of deprivation." 40 Resources were subsequently allocated to the ghettos, but deprivation was not substantially reduced; violence decreased, though Ryan points out that the gap between expectations (increased black enrollment in higher education) and attainments (employment in professional-managerial jobs) actually widened in the 1970's. 41 In a more recent study Gurr refines his model, but the use of such concepts as "stress" and "strain" places the new formulation more into the mass society camp and attitude variables are left out. 42 We cannot, of course, ignore the Marxist theory of economic exploitation. Marx wrote Capital in part to refute Rodbertus's claim (similar to that of de Tocqueville) in Die Handelskrisen und die Hypothekennoth der Grundbesitzer (1858) that worker unrest increases in periods of economic decline. One of Marx's interpreters argues instead that "crises are always preceded by a period in which wages rise generally and the working classes actually get a larger share of the annual product expected for consumption." 43 For Marx, as capitalism develops to the fullest, its internal contradictions increase; efforts to continue extracting a surplus value continually run into the fact that workers paid proletarian wages cannot consume all that is produced. Workers are more likely to become conscious of exploitation in good times, when it becomes clear that the lion's share of the benefits of prosperity belong to the capitalist, whereas in hard times the capitalists and proletariat suffer alike, an explanation consistent with the contrast between the turbulent 1960's and quiescent 1970's.
For Marx, worker unrest was defined materialistically as revolutionary activity, including strikes. Material conditions (nearpoverty status for workers alongside prosperity for capitalists) provoke worker unrest, mediated by an attitudinal element (class consciousness). His metaphysics was epiphenomenalist materialism ( Figure Id) . He did acknowledge that ideas play a role, but the inexorable stages of history did not allow ideas to have an independent role. Vladimir Lenin, noting that higher wages "bribed" the upper proletariat and thus reduced their revolutionary consciousness, had no alternative but to revise Marx to assign a more central role to the revolutionary vanguard, 44 but once again he insisted that Marxist theory was materialist and ideas were of epiphenomenal significance. Revolutionary leaders, better attuned to material realities than the ordinary worker, merely awaken the latter to the existence of objective economic conditions. For a contemporary Marxist, Herbert Aptheker, the riots of the 1960's were evidence that the exploited masses were participating in revolutionary acts that were more political and economic than racial in nature. 45 But attitudinal data show that reformist ideology prevailed among the rioters, who were more middle class in occupation and in group memberships. 46 If economic deprivation is at the root of urban unrest, we can ' THE REVIEW OF POLITICS see that theories of social disorganization and mass society are rather naive. But if reformist attitudes are the dominant driving forces of urban unrest, regardless of objective or subjective deprivation, we must look at other theorists.
According to political mobilization theory, ghetto dwellers engage in violence not because they are isolated from American culture but because they lack political power: they understand all too well how the American system operates, and they know that through the acquisition of political power they can hope to alleviate economic disparities within nonghetto America. This was the central thesis of the Skolnick volume; other scholars have argued the same point under such labels as the "new ghetto man" and "pro-riot ideology." 47 If urban unrest is a reaction to socioeconomic injustice and a resistance to the brainwashing that elite elements try to impose upon blacks and others to delude them into believing that they are being treated fairly by all institutions of American society, then we must attend to interests and political strategies by which groups pursue their interests.
Patterned after the utilitarian theory of John Stuart Mill, the mobilization theory developed by Charles Tilly and others* 8 assumes that groups pursue their own interests with whatever resources they possess; groups with the most resources are dominant, so each group seeks first to mobilize its fullest potentialities, then to seize power. Violence is a tool in this struggle, used both by elites and counterelites, just as von Clausewitz had said all along. Tilly argues that the determinants of collective action are "violations of established rights, the mobilization levels of different contenders for power, [and] the current costs of different forms of action," while the determinants of violent outcomes to collective action are "the presence or absence of counterdemonstrators, the tactics of repressive forces, [and] the length of time during which opposing parties are in direct contact." 49 At the end of each list, Tilly places "and so on," to indicate some ambiguity. Unrest occurs if groups seek more resources; violence results if one resists another in pursuing mutually incompatible objectives.
The metaphysics of mobilization theory may be characterized as mentalism (Figure le) , since attitudes (desires for more resources, mobilization of support from group members and other groups, as well as the opposition from other groups) are the sole determinants of behavior. Downtrodden groups seek more resources to overcome mistreatment because they want a larger share of the pie; rich groups want to maintain their larger slice. The poor use protest violence to make their point, and the elites counter with repressive violence. For a group to gain more resources, it must organize and mobilize, seeking coalitions with other groups; elites use the apparatus of the state to organize and mobilize on their own behalf. As William Gamson says, instead of the "duality of [social mobilization theory's] extremist politics and [mass society theory's] pluralist politics, there is simply politics." 50 But the theory is so general that it makes few predictions; in attempting to explain everything, it does not answer why some groups get the urge for more resources or why one group chooses to resist another.
Mobilization theory is related to the theory of institutional racism, which was articulated so eloquently by Stokely Carmichael, William Ryan, and others that the Kerner Report paid lip service to its thesis in its assertion that white racism has been responsible for the conditions of blacks in the United States. The perspective of institutional racism is that many policies, practices, and procedures of current institutions were designed a long time ago to discriminate against ghetto dwellers and in favor of middle class whites. Even though current decision-makers may claim that they harbor no racial prejudice, they nevertheless operate institutions that have built-in discriminatory methods of operations and thus are practicing racism just the same. Requiring a high school diploma to qualify for unskilled jobs in North Carolina, for example, works to the detriment of blacks because they graduate from high school at a lower rate than whites in that state. 51 Institutional racism is also evident when white police unjustly harass Watts residents in a manner that would make white communities in Los Angeles indignant. Indeed, Ryan was able to show that nearly all of the riots mentioned in the Kerner Report were triggered by just this type of police brutality. 52 Ryan's theory of institutional racism conceives of unrest as a psychomotor act of rioting or looting. Unrest occurs when an economically deprived group believes that its plight is the result of injustice-that is, violations of the American creed. As Gunnar Myrdal argued in 1943, the concept of the American creed was well known to blacks and whites alike, and it was also true that blacks were fully aware that whites did not practice the creed. The picture that emerges is that poorer whites, some of which are employed as police officers, particularly seek to prevent poorer blacks from rising in society. As white businesses want to run efficiently but do not want to run counter to social trends, they employ less efficient whites but derive lower profits than if they hired more efficient blacks through programs of affirmative action. Protests, then, can be used to remove the resistance to affirmative action, wherein the stress is supposed to be on qualifications rather than connections or race-biased personnel policies, procedures, and practices in job selection. White police may be particularly resentful of affirmative action; as representatives of their strata in society, police act out what their comrades would presumably do in their place. The findings of the Kerner Report are consistent with the theory of institutional racism; as already noted above, "rioters" first suffered employment discrimination, and their efforts at verbal protest preceded their arrests in the more violent confrontations.
The metaphysical interactionism of the theory of institutional racism sees material factors (economic deprivation) at the root of the problem (figure If). Those who are economically deprived accept an attitude (belief in the American creed) yet suffer materially (through discrimination), so they carry out a verbal campaign (protest) to motivate white society to live up to the American creed by eliminating the unequal treatment of blacks. Sometimes protest works, sometimes not. When the response to protest is material repression by elites (further unequal treatment, police brutality, and the like), the black community becomes so indignant that it retaliates against white society through material acts (burnings, looting, rioting). Of course, Myrdal's assumption that Americans have a consensus for a procedural American creed in which rights are accorded minorities has been questioned by such researchers as Samuel Stouffer in Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties. 55 If the theory of institutional racism seems less general than many of those considered above, a remedy is available. Our final theorist, Johan Galtung, conceptualizes institutional repression more generically as structural violence. His formulation begins with the statement that "violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations." 56 He then distinguishes dualistically between physical and psychological violence, between direct (personal) and indirect (structural) violence. Physical violence is direct. Structural violence exists because those in authority "try to preserve the status quo so well geared to protect their interests" 57 by restricting human potentialities and by permitting social injustice to persist. Direct violence kills quickly, but indirect structural violence -such as when an affluent society has plenty of food yet some in the society are undernourished because they cannot purchase or get access to food -kills, too, but more slowly. Galtung's theory emerges as the one best supported empirical thesis in Douglas Hibbs's cross-national study, Mass Political Violence. 58 Structural violence embodies four characteristics -exploitation, fragmentation, marginalization, and penetration. Elites maintain dominance by exploiting labor (asymmetrically distributing the benefits of labor), by penetrating nonelites (preventing the latter from having autonomy), by fragmenting interaction (atomizing underdogs), and by marginalizing (creating second-class citizens). Should nonelites seek to object to liberate themselves through vi-i olence or nonviolence, the response from elites will be further structural violence. Metaphysically, a material factor (uneven distribution of resources) is the main antecedent condition. To maintain the asymmetry of elite dominance, elites must pursue a policy (social injustice), inflicting mental as well as physical violence on nonelites. Nonelites then respond to social injustice through verbal as well as physical protest, whereupon elites apply physical countermeasures (physical or psychological violence), and the result is more structural violence (either physical or psychological). The result is epiphenomenalist materialism, as ideas play a secondary role in a struggle for power (figure lg).
By implication we may argue that Galtung sees black protest as a response both to excessive physical abuse of minority citizens by police and to unjust laws, policies, practices, and procedures of institutions. Galtung's notion of structural violence, hence, subsumes the concept of institutional racism into what we might call a generic theory of institutional discrimination, though of course he prefers the label "structural violence theory." If his theory is cor-rect, however, we would expect a lot more nonelite violence in totalitarian countries.
As urban rioting died down after the 1960's, concern for theories of urban unrest has subsided. The theories of institutional racism and structural violence claim to be the most inclusive perspectives today, thanks to their focus both on violence and protest conceptions of urban unrest. But the return to blaming-the-victim in the era of President Ronald Reagan reflects a disenchantment with the pursuit of equality. Insofar as the practical consequences of affirmative action appears to be that one or several successive generations of whites must permit large percentages of minorities to have jobs and positions at colleges that they would rather have for themselves (whether qualified or not), many whites resist reforms in institutional procedures that might reduce structural violence. 59 
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed several paradigms that focus on urban unrest. Differences over definition and key concepts are glaring, as we move from one paradigm to another. Most theorists are well aware that various approaches exist, but they persist in clinging to one among several alternatives. How do we rise above this myopia?
In the first section of this essay six objectives of a metaphysical analysis of paradigms are set forth. The first objective, clarifying the implicit assumptions of the various paradigms of political science, has been accomplished above, though the diagrams in Figure 1 are simplified for this presentation to provide a starting point. Discussion at a metaphysical level can be a discourse in which theorists will speak to each other, however much they may prefer to hide behind obscure formulations. Debates may now be directed at how to refute or to support the basic premises of one or another paradigm. As we show that all theories make metaphysical assumptions, the need to test the most fundamental assumptions should be placed as a top priority for future theory building.
Secondly, we urge researchers to include both attitudinal-perceptual and behavioral-material variables so that they can determine the relative impact of the two sets of factors (and theoretical explanations) before moving to subsidiary questions within each paradigm. An interactionist theory appears best suited at separating fundamental from marginal propositions in initial theory building and theory testing, as it does not seek to explain away the role of either attitudinal or material elements, as in the case of Marxist and political mobilization theories in particular.
Thirdly, we have found a number of glaring instances where theorists have failed to test their own paradigms in full. The inherent bias in the concept of "cultural deprivation" in social disorganization theory was unmasked when Whyte went into a slum in Boston to find out what others had assumed before him. Smelser's literary theory of mass society stands in sharp contrast with the careful quantitative presentation of Kornhauser's version of mass society theory. Gurr and coauthors test relative deprivation theory without including attitudes. Marx, who developed some of the early canons of social science theory testing, needs to be updated by those pursuing more modern social science methods. Political mobilization theory has too many "and so on" references. Each linkage in the theory of institutional racism is based on data but the entire structure of linkages has yet to be tested as a causal system of relationships. Structural violence theory has been tested only in part; attitudinal variables need to be specified.
In regard to our fourth objective, helping to construct critical tests of theories, we have identified some important exceptions to many of the predictions of the paradigms in the literature. The fact that only one in four black children lacks a father is embarrassing to social disorganization theory, which expects most socalled isolated minorities to be deprived. The fact that rioters are alienated but not atomized requires a revision of mass society theory. Gurr's predictions of the 1970's, based on relative deprivation theory, were for more violence until expectations were scaled down to the level of attainments in black America, yet violence subsided and expectations remained high. The role of revolutionary consciousness is downplayed by Marx, as he wished to be a strict metaphysical materialist, and Aptheker accordingly mistook black protest, articulated primarily by middle class blacks, as evidence of revolutionary ferment. Political mobilization theory, which insists that all violence results from a calculus of self-interest, seems easy to refute. Suicide is the most obvious example. The theory of institutional racism assumes that there is a widespread acceptance of the American creed, an assumption questioned by students of civil liberties. Structural violence theory pos-tulates that violence is a response to social injustice, so the quiescence of citizens of the Soviet Union is an anomaly that needs to be explained.
Ideologically based differences between paradigms, such as controversies among political scientists who are for or against Marxist approaches, can be transcended scientifically (though not normatively) by a focus on the role of material vis-a-vis nonmaterial factors. The scientific transcendence consists of an appreciation for studies that genuinely leave room for data to specify which types of underlying factors (ideational or material) best explain a particular phenomenon. The conservatives place their bets on social disorganization theory, the liberal moderates on mass society theory, and so forth, but they all rise and fall to the extent that they can both refute all other theories and provide evidence to support their own biases.
Finally, the research agenda for the study of urban unrest appears to be much clearer at this point than it was before exploring alternative paradigms in terms of metaphysical underpinnings. Researchers who continue to leave out attitudinal elements or material factors can hardly be expected to do so without considerable theoretical justification in the future. There are many unanswered questions, imperfect research designs, and unintegrated findings in the field, as we have demonstrated. Social disorganization theory needs to define "cultural deprivation" more clearly. Mass society theory should give more attention to operationalization, particularly of attitudinal components. Relative deprivation theory needs to take data from more recent eras into account, using attitude studies. Marxist theory should be tested in a conscientious manner with more recent data. Political mobilization theory should pay more attention to economic realities that underpin attitudes and interests. Institutional racism theory needs to be tested as a whole, rather than partially. And structural violence theory should be applied to Eastern European countries.
If we find that attitudes are more basic than material factors in a particular study, we need to step behind attitudes to see how they develop -whether, for example, there are materialist socialization factors. Our agenda can be expanded in this manner in many areas of research.
What is the general relationship between ideas and matter in political science? At this point it is obviously premature to say. Medical researchers investigating the impact of perceived stress on the incidence of disease are shedding new light on the basic metaphysical question of the role of the mind as the source of bodily dysfunctions. 60 Political scientists may be in a position to do likewise when they orient their research accordingly. A final answer will not emerge in the immediate future, if ever. What is important is to keep the question in the forefront so that more information will be continually available about the question; science and human understanding advances by improving upon previous research. Even Hume will have to demur in taking a sceptical view, as long as science follows his advance to collect more relevant data.
This essay is an effort to critique a theoretical literature. Conflicting paradigms are known to us all. One way to rise above the debates of the past is to take a "broader perspective," to quote Karl Mannheim, who noted that competing theories had differing value perspectives and metaphysical presuppositions. 61 Although I doubt whether political scientists will ultimately resolve metaphysical disagreements that were first framed some 2500 years ago, those who investigate urban unrest have a responsibility to sort out the metaphysical implications of their empirical findings, thereby advancing the debate beyond its current frontiers.
NOTES
